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The German dual apprenticeship system has come under pressure in recent years be-
cause enterprises have not been willing to provide a sufficient number of apprentice-
ship positions. An argument that is frequently put forward is that the gap could be
closed if more firms were willing to incur net costs during the training period. This
paper investigates on the basis of representative data whether German enterprises do
indeed incur net costs on average during the apprenticeship period, i.e. whether the
impact of an increase in the share of apprentices on contemporary profits is negative.
The paper uses the representative linked employer-employee panel data of the IAB
(LIAB) and takes into account possible endogeneity of training intensity and un-
observed heterogeneity in the profit estimation by employing panel system GMM
methods. An increase in the share of apprentices has no effect on profits. This can be
interpreted as a first indication that most establishments in Germany do not invest
more in apprentices than their productivity effects during the apprenticeship period.
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1 Introduction
The German apprenticeship system is stuck in a
deep crisis. Since 2002 the demand for apprentice-
ship positions has permanently exceeded the supply
(see figure 1). While eastern Germany traditionally
exhibits a lack of such positions, since 2003 demand
for them in western Germany has once again risen
above the available number of apprenticeship jobs
for the first time in years (see figures A1 and A2 in
the appendix).
A frequent reaction to the apprenticeship gap is the
complaint that firms do not invest enough in train-
ing apprentices. In this respect, it is usually argued
that apprentices’ wages frequently lie above their
productivity during their training period. This means
that companies have to recoup the positive net in-
vestment costs after the apprentice has completed
training. This might be a problem especially if the
shares of apprentices who stay at their training firms
are small or when the labour market situation does
not make it possible to pay skilled employees who
have been trained in-house a wage that is lower than
their productivity (Smits and Zwick 2004; Wolter et
al. 2006). An important empirical question that
needs investigating in order to be able to provide
advice on how to increase the number of apprentice-
ships is therefore whether German firms do invest in
apprentices during their training period, i.e. whether
they have net costs that have to be recovered after
the apprentices have completed training.
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A first indication that net investment costs during
the apprenticeship period are indeed an important
obstacle to an increase in apprenticeship training is
that according to the IAB establishment panel of
2004,1 the most important reasons for not conduct-
ing apprenticeship training were: “We cannot retain
the apprentices after the end of their apprentice-
ship” and “Self-conducted apprenticeship training is
too laborious/expensive”. By contrast, reasons such
as “We meet our requirements by hiring qualified
staff” or “We would like to provide apprenticeship
training but no appropriate applicants are available”
were not mentioned as frequently. This paper there-
fore tries to assess whether German establishments
do indeed incur net investment costs during appren-
ticeship training. This question is assessed empiri-
cally by measuring the impact of the apprentice
share or its change on the firm’s contemporaneous
profit (or its change) before the apprentices com-
plete training. If the impact is negative, we deduce
that establishments on average incur net investment
costs during the apprenticeship period.
Beicht et al. (2004) calculate that the net costs of
apprenticeship training amount to between 30 and
70% of the total training costs in Germany, while
Wolter et al. (2006) show that in the majority of
Swiss firms that provide apprentice training, produc-
tivity is at least equal to the apprentices’ wages. The
potential apprenticeship training costs of firms that
do not offer this kind of training are markedly
higher than the feasible productivity gain due to ap-
prenticeship training in Switzerland. Accordingly,
the non-training firms would have to accept greater
losses during apprenticeship training if they were to
provide such training. Both cross-section ap-
proaches have been carried out on the basis of ex-
tensive and careful measurements of the costs and
benefits of apprentices during the apprenticeship
training. They have to impute the potential appren-
ticeship benefits and costs of those firms that do not
train apprentices using selection models and cannot
directly tackle unobserved time invariant heteroge-
neity between firms, however.
In order to measure the impact of apprenticeship
training on company performance, one estimation
strategy is to compare the apprentices’ productivity
and their wages. In the literature the contributions
of different qualification groups to a company’s pro-
ductivity and their shares of the wage costs are usu-
ally calculated separately. Hellerstein et al. (1999)
1 This is a descriptive evaluation of item 84 of the IAB establish-
ment panel of 2004, concerning firms which, in spite of being
authorised to conduct apprenticeship training, do not offer ap-
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and Galindo-Rueda and Haskel (2005), for example,
compare in non-linear panel regressions the mar-
ginal productivity of different employee types with
their relative wages.2 A larger positive share of pro-
ductivity than the share of relative wages for a cer-
tain qualification group is interpreted as rent extrac-
tion by the firm from this qualification group. This
paper pursues a different route here Ð it constructs
a direct measure of profits and estimates the impact
that different shares of qualification levels have on
it, and it uses linear estimation models.
The contribution by Fouge `re and Schwerdt (2002) is
closer to our approach. They estimate the net effect
of the number of apprentices on the expected out-
put value for French and German firms using trans-
log production functions. They take the endogeneity
of apprenticeship training into account by using a
cross-section endogenous switching regression
model and distinguish between three groups of firm
sizes. They find a relatively high productive impact
of apprentices for medium-sized German establish-
ments (20Ð200 employees). They conclude that
small and large German establishments use appren-
ticeship training mainly to find and hire appropriate
skilled workers while the productivity contribution
is the most important motivator for medium-sized
establishments to provide apprenticeships.
This paper makes two main contributions to the lit-
erature on the impact of apprenticeship training on
the profitability of enterprises. It presents Ð for the
first time to my knowledge Ð direct evidence based
on representative and extensive data including train-
ing and non training establishments and it estimates
the contribution of the share of apprentices to estab-
lishment profit directly in a profit estimation. Here
the relatively low productivity of apprentices is com-
pared directly with their relatively low wages. More-
over, with the aid of panel estimation techniques
this paper takes the endogeneity in the composition
of the qualification structure into account in the
profit function as well as the unobservable time-in-
variant heterogeneity of firms.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
discusses the determinants of the demand for ap-
prentices and their impact on profits. Subsequently,
the estimation strategy of the paper is presented.
The fourth and the fifth sections describe the data
and the estimation results. The last section interprets
the findings and their implications.
2 Please note that these studies include neither apprenticeship
shares nor German data.
ZAF 2 und 3/2007 195
2 Literature and theoretical
background
When asked about the crucial motives for providing
apprenticeship training in their own firms, company
owners often point out the social responsibility, the
positive effects on the company’s image, or the com-
pany’s tradition of apprenticeship training (Sadow-
ski 1980; Stalder 1999; Niederalt et al. 2001; Schweri
et al. 2003). In contrast, empirical studies show that
the concrete decision for apprenticeship efforts
mainly depends on the company owner’s individual
cost-benefit calculation (Wolter et al. 2006).
According to the so-called “warehouse model”
(Backes-Gellner 1992, 1995) the optimal number of
apprentices is derived by calculating the costs of in-
house training and the costs of taking on workers
trained elsewhere. Thereby it is assumed that both
a shortfall and an excessive number of a firm’s own
apprenticeship trainees lead to opportunity costs.
The decision to provide apprenticeship training in
one’s own firm crucially depends on whether the
firm’s owner expects the training costs to be covered
during training by means of the apprentice’s own
productivity (productivity orientation, Lindley 1975;
Neubäumer 1999) or after training by the remunera-
tion of the newly trained employee who remains
with the firm being lower than his/her productivity
(investment orientation). If the firm has a productiv-
ity orientation, the apprentices’ contributions to
productivity during their apprenticeship period
cover or even exceed the apprentices’ wages, the
trainer’s wage, the acquisition and preservation
costs for material, instruments and infrastructural
facilities.
Based on Becker’s theory of human capital (Becker
1964), a number of models have been established
that motivate an investment orientation which al-
lows net investment costs during the apprenticeship
period. Ex post, the net investment costs for training
can be profitable for a firm if the personnel who are
trained in-house, and whose productivity is higher
than their wage, are subsequently employed in the
training firm (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999a, b;
Booth and Zoega 2000). Paying skilled employees
a wage that is lower than their productivity can be
justified by a number of arguments that focus on
labour market imperfections.
First of all, apprenticeship training may be mainly
industry-specific or rather firm-specific (Becker
1964). This means that the apprentice would have a
much lower productivity with other potential em-
ployers, which puts the training firm in a favourable
bargaining position (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a,Apprenticeship training in Germany Thomas Zwick
b; Smits and Stromback 2001). This argument is
weak in the German context because most qualifica-
tions are quite standardised, objectively tested and
easily transferable to other firms in the same sector
(Zwick 2001; Stevens 2004).
A further argument for a profit contribution by a
firm’s own apprentices after the end of their trainee-
ship is that apprentices prefer to stay in their home
region (Niederalt et al. 2001). Remuneration below
the productivity level is therefore possible as long as
it is not lower than elsewhere when considering the
opportunity costs for mobility (Harhoff and Kane
1997; Euwals and Winkelmann 2001).
Also, asymmetric information with regard to the
contents of training programmes can be considered
important for wage reductions. When external firms
cannot assess the specific training in a firm precisely,
there is an incentive to provide general training con-
tents, too. Hence, the result is a higher productivity
of a firm’s own apprentices which is not compen-
sated by an equivalent wage increase (Chang and
Wang 1996; Katz and Ziderman 1990; Smits and
Stromback 2001). The mechanism described above
seems not to be particularly relevant for Germany
because of the high transparency of the training con-
tents (Smits and Zwick 2004; Niederalt et al. 2001).
Asymmetric information on a specific apprentice’s
skills is another argument. Apprenticeship training
providers aim to retain a highly productive appren-
tice in their own firm. Their information advantage
over other firms is utilized by firing the less produc-
tive apprentices. External firms cannot assess the
real potential of a newly-trained apprentice and are
thus not willing to pay the full wage for them (El-
baum and Singh 1995; Franz and Soskice 1995; Ace-
moglu and Pischke 1998).
Altogether, there is neither a theoretical nor an em-
pirical consensus with regard to the extent to which
the demand for apprentices in Germany is influ-
enced by the willingness of firms to invest in appren-
tices (Schwerdt and Bender 2003; Dustmann and
Schönberg 2004). It is therefore unclear whether
firms pursue a productivity-oriented or an invest-
ment-oriented apprenticeship training policy. This
paper examines for the first time for Germany
whether the intensity of apprenticeship training in-
fluences the contemporary and the future profit per
employee. For this it assesses whether German firms
on average incur net investment costs during the ap-
prenticeship period or not.
In a production-oriented firm, a larger share of ap-
prentices increases profits. In contrast, in invest-
ment-oriented firms a larger share of apprentices re-
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duces contemporary profits. It can be positive in the
long run, however, to increase the share of apprenti-
ces if it is possible to keep the apprentices in the
firm after training and pay them a wage below their
productivity. Correspondingly, the relation between
the share of apprentices and contemporary profits is
an indicator of an orientation towards production or
towards investment.
We also include the share of other employee groups,
e.g. different qualification groups in the profit func-
tion. These shares can be affected by labour market
inflexibilities, i.e. in this case by dismissal protec-
tion. While firms can influence their share of ap-
prentices directly, especially shrinking firms may
face an inefficient composition of staff because em-
ployees cannot be laid off and replaced at will (Ber-
thold and Fehn 1998). Another reason for inflexibili-
ties and an inefficient composition of the workforce
may be a lack of suitably skilled job applicants
(Kölling 2002). As a consequence, some firms might
not have their profit-optimal employee mix and an
increase in the share of a particular employee group
would boost profits. Further personnel characteris-
tics that can play a role with regard to profits are
the share of foreign nationals (Zimmermann 1998),
as well as the average age and the average tenure
(Lazear 1981).
Classical explanatory factors for profits are the mar-
ket size and (international) competitiveness (Flet-
cher 2001; Gale 1972). These are taken into account
by the share of exports (Abel and Blanchard 1986).
Another important factor may be investments.
However, in contrast to the variables mentioned
previously it is not clear whether high investments
boost profits or whether high profits enhance the
investment affinity. In addition, works councils may
have an impact on profits or on productivity (Addi-
son et al. 2004; Zwick 2004). Finally, eastern Ger-
man firms are notoriously less profitable than their
western German counterparts.
For the following estimation it is important to note
that apart from the variables mentioned above, the
differentiation into different sectors, industries and
firm sizes, additional potentially important factors
cannot be observed. The quality of industrial rela-
tions or cyclic fluctuations in demand, for example,
can also be determinants of a firm’s profits but this
cannot be controlled for directly in our regressions.
3 Empirical specifications
In this paper the impact of the share of apprentices
on profits is estimated as follows:
πit = α +   · xit + y·u i + δi + εit, (1)Thomas Zwick Apprenticeship training in Germany
where t is a time indicator, i is an establishment indi-
cator, πit is the profit per employee, and x is a col-
umn vector of time-variant explanatory variables.
The column vector u represents (practically) time-
invariant explanatory variables. Finally, δ denotes
the unobservable time-invariant factors and ε stands
for the normally distributed error term with an ex-
pected value of zero.
In the first step the profit functions of the firm are
pooled, i.e. they are estimated as a cross-section re-
gression including observations from different years.
This increases the number of observations, it also
means that a firm that appears in several years,
though it is seen as a separate observation unit each
time. Moreover, an estimation bias can occur in this
specification because of the unobserved firm hetero-
geneity, i.e. most firms have unobserved characteris-
tics that influence both the firm’s profits and the
share of apprentices. Examples are the quality of in-
dustrial relations or the innovation pressure that a
firm faces. In our estimation, the influence that a
large share of apprentices has on profits is, for exam-
ple, upwardly biased when good industrial relations
lead to higher profits on the one hand and to greater
training endeavours on the other hand. A further
source of estimation bias is the possible endogeneity
of the share of apprentices and other explanatory
variables. It is possible that firms alter their qualifi-
cation structure simultaneously with profits or that
both are influenced by exogenous shocks such as a
positive trend in demand. It is conceivable, for ex-
ample, that higher profits are a consequence of good
personnel management and this also goes along with
relatively intensive apprenticeship training efforts.
In contrast, a relatively low profit level might be an
indication of a problem associated with structural
labour costs, which the establishment might try to
solve by substituting skilled workers with apprenti-
ces.
Time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity can be
avoided by estimating the model in first differences
or by demeaning the cross-section equations. In
other words, we explain the change in profits from
one year to the next by means of a change in the
composition of the qualification of the employees
and other covariates. In the second step, the profit
functions are therefore estimated using a so-called
fixed effects or within estimator (Wooldridge 2002:
267Ð269):
Δπit =   · Δxit + εit. (2)
Endogeneity of the explanatory variables can finally
be removed by an instrumental variable regression.
It is convenient, in this respect, to use GMM estima-
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tions with internal instruments, i.e. other moments
of the same variable (Arellano and Bond 1991).
More precisely, the first differences of the explana-
tory variables are instrumented here by the levels of
the lagged variables. We have to use lags t-2i ft h e
variables are potentially endogenous and lags t-1i f
they are predetermined. We argued above that in-
vestments might be predetermined, i.e. profits in the
last period have an impact on contemporary invest-
ments, while we assume that all other time-variant
covariates are potentially endogenous. The predic-
tion power of the internal instruments could be
small, however, given the only minor changes in the
qualification structure of the workforce from one
year to another, for example. This could evoke bi-
ases in the GMM estimator in first differences
(Blundell and Bond 1998).
We therefore prefer the so-called system GMM esti-
mator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995).
Here, the differences are instrumented again with
lagged levels as internal instruments. Simultaneously
the levels of the covariates are instrumented by ade-
quate lagged differences. The main advantage of this
approach is that besides the temporary differences,
also differences in levels between firms are taken
into account in the estimation. This improves the in-
formation used in identifying the effect and usually
enhances the precision of the estimator. A necessary
condition for the system GMM estimator is that the
correlations between the unobserved fixed effects
and the covariates remain constant over time (Arel-
lano and Bover 1995). The profit estimations are
carried out with the aid of a two-step method under
the application of Windmeijer’s adjustment process
for variances (Windmeijer 2005), using the com-
mand xtabond2 in STATA 9.2 (Roodman 2006).
4 Data
The data originate from the Linked Employer-Em-
ployee dataset of the IAB (LIAB), waves 1997Ð
2004. The LIAB combines the employment statistics
of the Federal Employment Agency (IABS) with
establishment data from the IAB establishment
panel. The employee statistics are taken from the
German Register of Employees (Beschäftigtenregis-
ter), which contains information on more than
98 percent of the employees in the firms of the IAB
establishment panel (Alda 2005). The advantage of
this linked data set is that it is not necessary to re-
sort to the subjective estimation of the respondents
in the IAB establishment panel with respect to the
crucial employee qualification variable, thus mini-
mising measurement error. The IAB establishmentApprenticeship training in Germany Thomas Zwick
panel is an annual survey of between 9,000 (in 1997)
and 16,000 (in 2004) establishments.3 As some ques-
tions are asked retrospectively, our panel spans the
period 1997Ð2003.
The profit variable is calculated by subtracting the
expenditure on inputs and the wage sum from the
turnover (all divided by the number of employees)
and by subsequently taking the logs in order to re-
duce the impact of outliers on the results.4 Because
of the lack of a variable concerning capital and capi-
tal costs in the panel, no capital costs can be consid-
ered when calculating the profits Ð I assume that
3 For further information on the IAB establishment panel see
Kölling (2000).
4 Profit per employee and investment per employee are added
with a constant Ð the largest negative number found in the vari-
ables Ð to ensure that all the values are positive and hence can
be logarithmised. The wage sum stems from the individual wage
information in the employment register. It is censored at the so-
cial security insurance ceiling. For the censored wage regressions,
we use an imputation procedure analogous to that described in
Addison et al. (2006).
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this is unproblematic especially in the estimation
specifications based on differences because it seems
improbable that capital costs vary with shares of ap-
prentices. Investments, profits and employee charac-
teristics are divided by the number of employees in
order to avoid measuring scale effects such as a posi-
tive correlation between the levels of investments
and profits. This means, for example, that profits per
employee are explained by the share of apprentices.
As motivated above, we distinguish between the
groups “in apprenticeship training”, “lower second-
ary school qualification without vocational train-
ing”, “lower secondary school qualification with
vocational training”, “upper secondary school leav-
ing certificate without vocational training”, “upper
secondary school leaving certificate with vocational
training”, “degree from a university of applied sci-
ences/polytechnic”, and a “degree from a univer-
sity”. Here we take into account full-time employees
only because a similar classification of qualifications
is not available for part-time employees and we
have no information about working hours. We alsoThomas Zwick Apprenticeship training in Germany
include further employee characteristics such as the
average tenure and age, the share of foreigners, fe-
males and part-time employees. Two indicators for
industrial relations are also included: the presence
of works councils and collective bargaining. Finally,
it can be assumed that investment per employee and
the export share are correlated with profits.
The variable “in apprenticeship training” in the
IABS also includes volunteers, interns, apprentices
in full-time vocational schools (e.g. in the healthcare
sector), as well as participants in vocational training
and initial training. Therefore, interns and volun-
teers whose careers are still not established are ex-
cluded from the information on “activity per-
formed”. Furthermore, an alternative variable is
generated from the social insurance notification
(DEÜV Meldung), which explicitly excludes interns,
working students, and short-term employees. In
both variables the shares of apprentices are slightly
larger than in comparable data sets, at around 8%
of the workforce, partly because they include ap-
prentices in full-time vocational schools and em-
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ployees participating in continuing training. As a ro-
bustness test, the subjective information on the
share of apprentices from the respondents of the
IAB establishment panel was also used. All three
indicators for the share of apprentices yield practi-
cally the same results and therefore only the results
based on the social insurance notification are pre-
sented (cf. table 1).
5 Findings
The pooled profit estimation in table 2 shows that
the share of apprentices is significantly negatively
correlated with profits. In addition, higher invest-
ments per employee, the presence of works councils,
collective bargaining, and the export share are all
positively correlated with profits. The share of em-
ployees with a qualification below the level of the
upper secondary school certificate has a negative
correlation, while the share of employees with a
higher qualification is positively correlated withApprenticeship training in Germany Thomas Zwick
profits. The share of foreigners and part-time em-
ployees is positively correlated with profits while the
share of female employees is negatively correlated.
The pooled regression might be biased because ob-
servations of the same company in different years
are regarded as independent, and unobserved heter-
ogeneity cannot be taken into account. The fixed ef-
fects regression in table 3 correspondingly shows a
smaller number of significant coefficients. Higher in-
vestments per employee and a larger share of part-
time employees still correlate positively with higher
profits per employee. The share of apprentices is
now insignificant, while again employees with lower
qualification levels have a negative correlation with
profits and employees with higher qualification lev-
els have a positive correlation with profits. Average
tenure is now negatively correlated with profits.
Please note that we had to exclude all time-invariant
variables in the fixed effects estimation.
The endogeneity problem is tackled in the system
GMM regressions. Here, the lagged endogenous
variable is added and instrumented. Investment per
employee is regarded as a potentially predetermined
variable, the dummies for industry, time, works
councils, collective bargaining, eastern Germany and
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firm size are assumed to be exogenous. The remain-
ing variables are potentially endogenous. The lagged
endogenous variable has a significantly positive im-
pact on profits per employee (cf. table 4). Both the
lagged share of apprentices and the contemporary
share of apprentices have a positive but insignificant
impact on profits. These results of our preferred esti-
mation specification therefore correspond with re-
sults from Switzerland to the effect that the majority
of firms are not willing to bear net costs during ap-
prenticeship training (Wolter et al. 2006). They are,
however, in contrast to German studies based on
surveys of direct costs and benefits, which indicate
that firms incur net costs during the apprenticeship
training period in almost all apprenticeship occupa-
tions (von Bardeleben et al. 1995; Beicht et al.
2004).
While the contemporary shares of lower secondary
education with and without vocational training and
the share of employees with a university degree
have a negative impact on profits, their lagged val-
ues are positive. According to our theoretical hy-
potheses, the contemporaneous share of investments
has a positive impact on profits per employee. Both
the share of part-time employees and the share of
foreigners have a positive impact on profits. TheThomas Zwick Apprenticeship training in Germany
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presence of works councils has a positive impact on
profits, location in eastern Germany a negative im-
pact.5 The estimation diagnostics indicate that our
preferred estimation specification is acceptable: the
Hansen test does not indicate over-identification
and the Arellano-Bond test does not indicate
AR(2).
6 Conclusions
This paper examines for the first time the impact
of (changes in) apprenticeship training intensity on
(changes in) firms’ profits in the same and in the
subsequent year for Germany. The data basis is the
1997Ð2004 waves of the representative linked em-
ployer-employee data set of the IAB (LIAB). This
data set has the advantage that crucial variables
such as the wage sum, the qualification-level shares
and the share of apprentices in an establishment
stem from administrative individual data and they
are therefore measured with a comparatively low
measurement error.
The main question which this paper tries to answer
is whether German establishments are investment-
oriented and accept net costs during the training pe-
riod or whether they already try to recoup these
costs via the apprentice’s productivity during the
training period. The motivation for this exercise is
the notion that if German establishments invested
more in apprenticeship training, the current gap in
apprenticeship offers could probably be reduced.
Our preferred estimation version shows that on av-
erage an increase in the share of apprentices has no
impact on establishment profits in the same year or
a year later. We might interpret this as a first indica-
tion that the majority of German firms do not pay
more for the apprentices than their productivity dur-
ing the apprenticeship period. This finding is similar
to results from Switzerland and indicates that a
greater willingness to invest in apprentices could po-
tentially increase the number of apprenticeships of-
fered.
In order to identify which establishments pay more
than productivity during apprenticeship training and
which occupations lead to net costs or returns dur-
ing the apprenticeship period there are several natu-
ral extensions to the present approach. On the one
hand, differences in the profit impact of training in-
tensities for several groups of establishments (for
example those with and without works councils, es-
5 These coefficients may be biased, however, because we do not
correct for potential endogeneity.
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tablishments in a certain sector, size bracket, region
etc.) should be analysed. On the other hand, the
share of different occupations that have different
net costs during apprenticeships (cf. Schweri et al.
2003 or Beicht et al. 2004) should be taken into ac-
count.
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